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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess the feasibility of risk-contingent credit (RCC) by 
presenting an experimental and participatory game designed to explain the concept of RCC to 
Kenyan pastoralists and dairy farmers. The paper investigates the uptake potential of RCC through 
qualitative assessment of field experiments and focus groups. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper presents a method of community engagement 
through a participatory game played in a series of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The paper 
also presents theoretical justification of RCC in credit market structure. 
Findings – The game effectively explains the concept and mechanism of RCC by reflecting local 
situation and production potential. Participatory exercises within focus group discussions indicate 
that there exists a strong interest and support for RCC.  
Research limitations/ implications – The methodology described in this paper can be used in 
extension programs for promoting innovative rural microcredit in developing countries but should 
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Introduction 
Agricultural risks and limited access to credit are not only serious impediments to agricultural 
productivity, but also remain two of the main sources of potential poverty traps in developing 
countries. With 75% of Kenya’s population employed within agriculture, and 51% of the country’s 
overall GDP derived from the sector, agricultural productivity is critical. Pastoral and dairy 
livestock production plays an important role in rural livelihoods in Kenya where the main risks in 
this sector are weather and market price variability. To a significant extent these uncertainties are 
attributable to credit constraints facing Kenyan farmers. Lack of credit constrains optimal input 
use, limits marketing opportunities, and contributes to disinvestment and poverty traps. While rural 
bank branches have grown 81% over the last five years, banks are still averse to lending in 
agriculture. Uninsured risks and lack of access to credit force farmers to adopt low-risk, low-return 
activities, resulting in wide-spread and persistent poverty.  
One innovative credit mechanism that could not only enhance farmers’ access to credit but 
also help them manage risks is Risk Contingent Credit (RCC). RCC is a general term for any credit 
instrument that embeds within its structure a contingent claim or insurance which, when triggered 
transfers part or all of the borrower’s liability to the lender or integrator/counterparty (Shee and 
Turvey 2012). Because RCC balances both financial risk and business risk it addresses many 
problems regarding credit in developing countries including (a) the relaxation of credit constraints, 
(b) mobilizing farmers' abilities to improve productivity and increase household income, (c) 
reducing credit risk, (d) maintaining liquidity balancing, (e) removal or reduction of  collateral risk 
and risk rationing, and (f) reductions in loan default. When properly employed, risk-contingent 
credit structures can provide the proper incentives to entice banks to increase the supply of credit 
to small farmers.  Even in regions that have access to credit, there is a significant number of farm 
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households that ‘risk-ration’  themselves out of the credit market for fear of losing collateral and 
livelihoods when natural or economic adversity hits (for details about risk rationing see Boucher 
et al. 2008, Verteramo et al. 2015). As a target of rural credit policy, it is a pro-growth inclusive 
advancement on conventional credit products, and one we believe will ultimately impact credit 
demand and supply in a socially optimal way.  
The objective of this study is to assess the uptake potential of RCC in pastoral and dairy 
farm communities in Kenya by using a participatory game played in a series of focus groups held 
by the authors in July 2013. This is done in the spirit of  McPeak et al. (2010) who describe how 
‘games’ were used to educate pastoralist in Kenya’s indexed based livestock insurance scheme 
(see Chantarat et al. 2013). Thus, our approach is more qualitative than quantitative, but is a useful 
addition to the agricultural finance/risk/development literature by illustrating and describing how 
baseline information can be gathered in a pragmatic way.  By engaging farmers in open discussion 
specific aspects of risk including source, seasonality, frequency, duration, intensity and 
consequences, can be established.  These attributes can ultimately be part of the RCC design. 
The next section discusses the evolution of risk-contingent credit. This is followed by an 
assessment of the productive investment potential and risks in pastoral and dairy farming in Kenya, 
followed by an overview of RCC and its theoretical justification in credit market structure. This is 
followed by a description of the participatory RCC game to effectively explain the concept and 
mechanism of RCC to farmers. The next section describes the findings of the field assessment 
from both pastoral and dairy farming areas. The final section provides concluding comments. 
 
The Evolution of Risk-Contingent Credit 
The idea of RCC first appeared in a description of programs in the Philippines, Sri Lanka and India 
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in which farmers pledged a portion of any crop insurance indemnities to cover loan losses (Adams 
and Vogel 1986). This was based on an honor system with only an indirect linkage to credit. Jin 
and Turvey (2002) developed a number of RCC loan structures for operating loans, farm 
mortgages and bonds based on weather index insurance. Skees and Barnett (2006) introduced the 
idea of a meso-level insurance in which lenders acquired index insurance against perils that were 
highly correlated with loan losses. They describe a World Bank  project in Malawi that linked 
index insurance to production loans and suggested that index insurance could also be linked to 
commercial loans. Other examples include insurance against El-nino related risks in Peru, the 
Indian MFI BASIX’s purchase of rainfall insurance in 2004 and 2006 to offset loan losses against 
drought and flood perils; and the use of indexed based livestock insurance in Mongolia. Linkages 
to farmer producers under a meso-scheme are designed to make indemnity payments based on 
actual losses (Skees and Barnett 2006).   The El-nino was followed up by Collier et al (2011) and 
Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega (2011), and Weber et al (2015) who discuss a meso-insurance scheme 
based on rainfall for cotton producers in Tajikistan. At the micro-level, Shee and Turvey (2012) 
showed how risk-contingent instruments can be priced in practice using simulated field data. They 
concluded that an imbedded price option for pulse crops in India provided downside risk protection 
for pulse farmers.  Turvey, Bogan and Yu (2012) apply RCC to price risk protection for New York 
dairy farms, and Chantarat et al. (2007, 2008) adapt the model to pre-empt rainfall related famine 
risk in Kenya. Carter (2011) examined the impacts of linked credit on financial market deepening 
and its impacts on farm households, concluding that linked credit capitalized the adoption of new 
technology. In randomized control trials (RCT) Giné and Yang (2009) investigated adoption of an 
operating loan in Malawi in which the payoff was determined by rainfall, and Karlan et al. (2011) 
investigated the adoption of price-contingent credit in Ghana.  
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The demand for RCC appears to be promising, but research is still in its infancy. For 
example in (unpublished) field research conducted by one of the authors in 2009 indicated that 
57% of Chinese farmers would be moderately interested or very interested in RCC type structures, 
and in 2010 this was 50%. Likewise, in a 2011 survey of Mexican grain and oilseed farmers, 
identical questions indicated that 51% of participants would be interested in such a product. These 
are in line with the 17% uptake rates found by Giné and Yang (2009) in Malawi. It should be noted 
however that Giné and Yang’s (2009) RCT was tied to loans for the adoption of new technology 
and only 33% of farmers offered conventional loans chose to accept it. A very important insight 
by Giné and Yang (2009) that requires much more study is the sensitivity of loan demand to the 
additional risk premium in interest rates. Using option pricing theory, Shee and Turvey (Table 3, 
Page 571, 2012) show that the range of risk premiums relative to a 12% base ranged from 1.83% 
to 25.6% for different pulse crops in different Indian markets depending upon historical price 
volatility.  Moreover, simulated results of representative farms for pulse crop farmers in India by 
Shee and Turvey (2012) indicate that risk contingent (price) credit can substantially improve 
minimum incomes, as well as lead to decreased risk in crop revenues, while increasing beneficial 
positive revenue skewness.   
 
Productive investments and risks in Kenya’s pastoral and dairy economies 
Pastoralism is the key livelihood in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) in northern Kenya. 
Pastoralists not only derive their diets from livestock such as milk, meat and blood (Fratkin and 
Roth, 2005) but they also consume market products (mainly cereals) by selling livestock (Barrett 
and Luseno, 2004). Figure 1 illustrates the main reasons that the households keep livestock in the 
region. The major importance of livestock is that they are the main source of savings and status, 
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and also serve as a source of food from milk. Pastoralists also earn income from selling/trading 
milk, meat, and live animals.  
 
                                         Figure 1 Role of livestock in Marsabit; Source: ILRI Household Survey 
 
The primary investment vehicle is via expansion of herd size. Lybbert et al. (2004) argue that 
households with larger herd sizes have a greater potential to recover from extreme droughts, 
whereas those with smaller herds do not. Investment opportunities also exists for livestock trading, 
building of trading stocks, animal care, milk trade and selling, and small enterprises such as salt 
sales, fodder sales, and shop keeping. For agro-pastoralists, investment in rain-fed food crop 
production is also a productive investment opportunity in some areas.   
The main uncertainty in the pastoral economy is weather (mainly drought). Other market 
and economic risks are also associated with drought conditions. During dry seasons, pastoralists 
face forage/feed scarcity, and as a result they migrate (and in extreme events they even destock). 
It is well documented that immediately following a drought, prices fall as herders cull their stocks 
and flood the market with meat. This is followed by a steep increase in prices as live animals clear 
from the market.  Pastoralists are then left in a situation in which their herd stock is depleted, and 
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restocking becomes prohibitively expensive. Given that livestock production is the main economic 
driver in this region, virtually all markets are affected by any economic shock as all potential 
livelihood activities are typically linked in some way with livestock markets.  
Smallholder dairy farming plays a very important role in Kenya’s economy, with more 
than one million smallholder dairy farmers contributing about 70 percent of gross milk production 
from farms (Muriuki 2011). Smallholder dairy farming is characterized by low productivity (about 
5 kg milk per cow per day on average) and low input use. Mburu et al. (2007) identifies milk prices 
as one of the main risks in smallholder dairy farming and find that milk price negatively affects 
farmers’ adoption of milk value chains. They also suggest that access to credit needs to be 
improved to help intensify production practices. The main investment needs in dairy farming are 
purchase of cows, feed and nutrient supplements, veterinary care, cattle sheds, and equipment such 
as pulverizes.  
Variable seasonal weather conditions are the key source of risk in milk production in East 
Africa. In the dry season (for example Jan, Feb, March) farmers face feed scarcity, and as a result 
many farmers move their cattle. Due to this feed scarcity, milk supply falls, and as a result milk 
price increases. In wet seasons when more feed is available, milk production increases and abrupt 
ships in supply drive prices down significantly. Clearly there exists a dynamic relationship 
between weather condition and milk price, which is highly seasonal in nature, but the intensity can 
vary from year-to-year (Figure 2). Not only is it important to investigate the weather and price risk 
in detail, but it is critical to develop an appropriate pricing formula for managing risk for dairy 
farmers.  
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Figure 2 Kenya milk prices in $/lbs; Source International Livestock Research Institute; displays monthly price series 
for milk received by dairy farmers from January 2009 to December 2012. The graph reveals significant periods in 
which prices drop precipitously or rise rapidly. These movements are largely weather related, and are linked to the 
arrival, duration and intensity of long and short rains, and as such are largely driven by supply shocks, although 
perhaps not exclusively. 
 
Overview of risk contingent credit 
The risks faced by Kenyan pastoralist and dairy farmer significantly impact their willingness to 
use credit, and perhaps more significantly their ability to source formal credit given the significant 
business risks involved which could ultimately lead to collateral loss.     
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The RCC mechanism is depicted in figure 1 where the upper graph shows loan repayment and 
lower graph represents underlying option (insurance) payout. If the underlying risk (weather and/or 
commodity price-related) increases and crosses a certain threshold, the total repayment obligation 
of a farmer falls linearly. On the other hand, if the underlying risk decreases beyond the threshold, 
the loan has to be repaid with the additional risk-contingent interest rate load (which includes a 
risk premium above the base market rate). Risk contingent credit has therefore the unique 
characteristic that even though farmers have to pay a premium (in the form of higher interest) 
during normal circumstances, they are able to insure default risk. RCC is priced to an actuarially 
fair interest rate that is interlinked with the underlying risk. RCC thus offers a market-based 
solution that would provide larger and long term credit to cater to the investment needs in 
agriculture. The advantages of risk contingent-credit can be summarized as follows: 
1) A common argument for the stagnant agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa is 
that the absence of credit leads to inefficient use of inputs, suboptimal production, lower 
food supply, and higher priced food products. Improved access to credit and downside risk 
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management through RCC can alleviate many of these constraints in the short run and 
encourage technology adoption and growth in the long term.  
2) Since RCC embeds an insurance component that mitigates risks in agriculture, supporting 
production at times of negative shocks, it can promote resilience among farmers. 
3) With the insurance component embedded in the credit product, lenders will reduce (or 
eliminate) collateral requirements, thus increasing demand by poor and risk-rationed 
smallholder farmers. It also eliminates the drawbacks of standalone index insurance 
products by not requiring the farmers who may be liquidity constrained to pay upfront 
premium.  
4) Because the credit is interlinked with the price and/or quantity risks of the product 
produced by the farmer, loan default risk can be reduced significantly. 
The approach to designing an RCC product involves the calculation of actuarial 
options/insurance premiums included directly into the credit formulas for risk-contingent loans. 
The risk-adjusted interest rates can be determined above the base interest rate of a collateralized 
loan that reflects the expected value of the indemnified risk. Following Shee and Turvey (2012), 
we assume that the lender is indifferent between receiving the present value of an operating loan
f , at market interest rate **r  and a risk-contingent operating loan with an embedded option at an 
interest rate *r . The interest rate, therefore, is the rate that would make the lender indifferent 
between an operating loan with the linked weather option and one without the option. Assuming a 
hedge ratioψ , strike price WK  and loan length T, the interest rate is determined by        
(1)          
( )( ) ( )**
*
0,
ln r TW
E Max K W t
e
f
r
T
ψ  −  +
  =   , with    * **r r r> > and, 
W
f
K
ψ =         
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Weather-related information, such as rainfall and vegetation, can be used to measure weather risks 
faced by farmers.  The term ( )( )0, WE Max K W t −   in (1) captures the indemnity structure and 
can be tied to a weather index insurance such as in Jin and Turvey (2002) and Giné and Yang 
(2009) , the equilibrium option price of a non-traded cash commodity such as in Shee and Turvey 
(2012) or a traded option such as in Turvey et al (2012). Although these papers have examined 
RCC at the micro-level, a similar structure can be used for meso-insurance as well, with the term 
ψ  adjusted to capture aggregated loan portfolios. 
RCC structures have several desirable features. Unlike traditional credit products, RCC 
structures facilitate risk management by layering hedging protection into loan repayment 
obligations. Due to the nature of the agricultural and financial infrastructure in developing 
countries, producers are typically unable to access or replicate these types of risk management 
tools themselves. On the other hand, financial institutions are in a much more natural position to 
provide contingencies for and bear such risks. Specifically, the lender is in a natural position to 
aggregate and manage these risks (with insurance and reinsurance partners) for pools of producers 
and can also more easily access global financial and reinsurance markets to hedge the resulting 
risk in their portfolios arising from the RCC contracts. Finally, packaging the loan directly with 
the risk management instrument reduces due diligence and agency costs associated with verifying 
if the farmer is insured or not, and in fact any "indemnity" type payments never need pass through 
the farmers’ hand, thus resulting in reduced credit risk for the bank. 
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Description of field games for RCC  
In this section we describe the field games. The games were used as a vehicle for a broader 
discussion of livelihoods, risk and credit. The study regions were in the temperate dairy region 
around Olkalou in Nyandarua County, and arid and semi-arid pastoral region in Northern Kenyan 
Marsabit County. Both regions are of interest because both are affected by the long and short rains 
that are characteristic of Sub-Saharan Africa. Pastoral farmers face drought risk when either long 
or short, or both long and short rains fail. Participants noted that in the dairy regions of southern 
Kenya, there is a strong relationship between seasonal rainfall patterns and milk prices. We discuss 
the precise locations and agricultural conditions in the summary section that follows. 
As previously indicated, little is known about how farmers would perceive RCC. Our context is 
the linking of RCC to a weather index insurance with basis risk. Of concern is farmers’ financial 
understanding of how RCC pays indemnities (McCPeak et al 2009) and relates to loan repayment, 
sensitivities to the interest rate premiums as found in Giné and Yang (2009), and potential Type I 
and Type II errors arising from spatial basis risk. The purpose of designing a game for RCC is to 
convey the attributes and features of RCC using a participatory role play. The objective was to 
demonstrate how RCC works and how it is able to provide protection against specific covariate 
risks. The game was played in three parts and moderated by staff from the International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI, Nairobi Kenya) who were familiar with local agricultural conditions and 
practices and could speak local dialects. The authors were in attendance at all focus groups and 
meetings and were available for questioning and discussion. Our focus groups included dairy 
farmers in a temperate agricultural region and pastoral herders and farmers in arid and semi-arid 
regions.  
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Play 1: After dividing the participants into 7-8 dyadic groups, play 1 information sheet (see 
appendix) is distributed with a verbal explanation in local dialect. The participants were provided 
with two choices; traditional practice (T) and high potential practice (H). Traditional practice 
(traditional dairy practice, traditional agriculture etc.) does not need a loan because it requires less 
investment. Using traditional practice a farmer can earn 10,000 ksh (Kenyan shilling) in a normal 
season and earn nothing (livestock die or crop fails) in bad season. High potential practice, on the 
other hand requires a loan (traditional credit or TC) of 4,000 ksh for investment in a high quality 
dairy practice or improved crop production practice. High potential practice can yield earnings of 
30,000 ksh in a good season and zero earning in bad season.  
After understanding these two options, the responses from farmer groups were recorded on 
a flip chart. A realized weather (risk) condition was then decided through a random draw of a 
marker out of a bag with 1 red (represents bad weather) and 4 green (represents normal weather) 
markers. The end of season earnings for all the groups were then calculated (see appendix table 
A1). The groups that selected traditional practice with no credit earned 10,000 ksh in a normal 
season but earn nothing in a bad season. The groups that chose the high potential practice with 
traditional credit earned 26,000 ksh (30,000 – 4,000) in a normal season but in bad season their 
earning was -4,000 ksh because of loan repayments.  
Play 2: In play 2, RCC was introduced with high potential practice (H) as a third option. With 
RCC, if the season was normal farmers had to repay the principal amount (4,000 ksh) with a risk 
premium of 400 ksh (this amount is actuarially fair interest rate with RCC and loading from the 
bank). On the other hand, if the realized season was bad, with RCC the farmers were not required 
to repay any part of the loan (principal or interest). Hence, in play 2, participants could choose 
from three choice sets as discussed in the play 2 information sheet (see appendix). After deciding 
14 
 
the realized season through a random draw as mentioned in play 1, the end of season earning was 
calculated using the following formula.  
End of the season earning = amount earned from the practice – loan repayment – risk premium  
With the RCC and the high potential practice, the respondents end of the season earning 
was 25,600 ksh (30,000 – 4,000 - 400) with a normal season but seasonal earnings from a bad 
season was zero because there was no repayment obligation with RCC in the bad season (see 
appendix table A1). Examining the earning table for all three options, it was observed that with 
RCC farmers were not subject to negative seasonal earnings but with traditional credit they earned 
negative 4000 ksh in the bad season, even though normal season earning with RCC was less than 
tradition credit. It is through this mechanism that RCC protects downside risks faced by farmers; 
even though farmers are worse off during the normal season compared to tradition credit, they are 
able to get protection in the bad season (protection against downside risks).  
Play 3: In play 3, we introduced the concept and behavior of RCC under basis risk. Basis risk is a 
situation when individual risk experience does not match with what aggregate index predicts. This 
is inherent problem with any index based insurance (Barnett 2004; Norton et al. 2013; Woodard 
and Garcia 2008a, b). Due to basis risk there might be a small chance that the actual conditions 
faced by the farmer may be bad, but the contingent situation could be normal requiring that farmers 
have to repay the loan with contingent interest rates. This play has an extra stage where basis risk 
is determined by a random draw of color markers similar to the determination of realized seasons. 
Drawing a green marker meant that contingent credit operated as described earlier (repay principal 
amount with risk premium in normal season, but in bad season repay nothing). But if the draw is 
a red marker, farmers were required to pay the full principal amount (4000 ksh) with a risk 
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premium (400 ksh).  The sample of calculated end-of-season earnings with basis risk are 
provided in appendix table A1 using the same formula given in play 2.  
 
Findings of the field assessment and focus groups 
In this section we present qualitative results from a series of focus groups in two contrasting 
livestock producing regions in Kenya. At each of the four focus group sites (see Figure 4) we 
conducted an RCC game as described in last section. The local experts introduced the RCC game, 
indicating that we were to discuss the risk and credit situation in their livelihood, explaining that 
we were there to understand risk and credit, that nothing was to be sold or given, and that we were 
there to gain insights for research and potential product development purposes. The purpose of the 
RCC game in the focus groups were not to gather primary data for empirical analysis, but rather 
to generated group discussion, identify high level information regarding risks faced and potential 
product feasibility, and to gauge overall interest in RCC. We document the responses in the focus 
groups along with RCC games and report the nature of the discussions as they unfolded. Focus 
groups were guided on the basis of the following; understanding farmers’ livelihood, risks and 
coping mechanism, credit demand, and perception about RCC.  
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                                               Figure 4 RCC study sites in Kenya 
 
Olkalou sub-county  
Olkalou sub-county is located in a remote pasture land in Nayandarua County where the 
East African Dairy Development (EADD) project, a milk value chain initiative lead by Heifer 
International, helps local farmers centrally deliver milk for processing.  23 small dairy producers, 
including 5 women, participated in the focus group discussion. The participants were members of 
a dairy producers’ organizations of dairy hubs in the area promoted by EADD. Average dairy cow 
holding per producer household reported was about three to five. The necessary inputs for dairy 
farming as mentioned in the discussion were feed, nutrient supplements, cattle sheds, veterinary 
care, wiring and fencing for paddocks, among others. Fodder is usually grown on the farm, and 
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some farmers lease lands for fodder production. They also purchase feed from input shops and 
other suppliers. Artificial insemination services are also used with support EADD. Some dairy 
farmers are also involved in mixed farming including maize, beans, and poultry.   
Seasonal production fluctuations and milk price volatility were reported as the primary 
sources of risk in dairy production. Milk prices fluctuate widely according to rainy/dry seasons. In 
the dry season (for example Jan, Feb, March) the price range is about 30-34 ksh/liter but forage, 
feeds and supplements must be purchased at a higher price. However, in the wet season when 
forage and grazing is abundant, market prices typically fall to about 22-24 ksh/liter. The 
seasonality of prices and the volatility of prices within the seasons were universally acknowledged 
by the producers.    
Farmers’ demand for credit was greatest for animal purchases. A typical farmer required 
about 40,000 ksh to purchase a cow, but some farmers were willing to borrow between 100,000 to 
as high as 200,000 ksh if they could obtain the credit. Loans in some cases were available from 
the Agricultural Development Cooperation as well as commercial sources such as Equity Bank. 
Some farmers were members of a self-help saving and lending groups. This was referred to as a 
‘village Bank’. Farmers agreed generally that the repayment period and timing of credit did not 
often match the production cycle or the rainfall cycle. With animals required for collateral, farmers 
were risk rationed and unwilling to expand credit for fear of losing the animals, and hence their 
basic livelihood. Likewise it was acknowledged that lenders were unwilling to lend large 
expansionary type loans to meet demand in any case.   
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When the RCC game was played with risk contingent credit linked to the price of milk, 
farmers were able to immediately see how it would balance the risks that they face. In play 2, all 
7 groups chose high potential practice with RCC rather than traditional credit option. Several forms 
of RCC were discussed. The most obvious form was to link the price of milk to the loan, but which 
price to use? The dynamics of prices in the wet season are substantially different from those in the 
dry season including underlying volatility. This suggests that an RCC product might be best 
employed on dual price triggers, one for the wet season price and the other for the dry season. 
Variants on this include designing a product on the average price within each season. Farmers also 
discussed the counter-cyclicality of milk prices and feed costs for which a gross margin product 
might be effective. An advantage of a gross margin product is that it would be smoother, or less 
volatile, than prices alone and could be assigned to the average gross margin across seasons.  
Indeed, similar approaches have become the preferred risk management policy vehicle in the 
United States (Woodard and Baker, 2013). 
Turbi sub-county 
Pastoral production systems in Northern Kenya are in stark contrast to the temperate dairy 
region discussed above. Pastoral livestock grazing is the main livelihood in the region, as crop 
production is largely not feasible due to low and erratic rainfall and poor soil conditions. Turbi is 
a remote pastoral sub-county in Marsabit County in Northern Kenya. 16 pastoral farmers including 
10 women participated in the focus group discussion. The main livestock reported were camel and 
goat (very few pastoralists raise cattle) in Turbi. Turbi is located close to the Ethiopian border, and 
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skirmishes with neighboring villages regarding grazing rights are not entirely uncommon. A 
typical household would have about 5 camels and 30-40 goats on average. The main livestock 
market was located in Moyale, a town bordering with Ethiopia. As reported in the focus group, the 
price of an adult camel ranged from 25,000 ksh to 40,000 ksh whereas price of a goat ranged from 
4,000 ksh to 8,000 ksh. All women participants were from women self-help groups. The self-help 
group members do various enterprising activities such as livestock trading, maize milling, and 
milk selling etc. There were at least 5 different women’s groups in the village. There was no local 
bank or bank branch, but the self-help groups have opened bank accounts in distant Marsabit to 
facilitate group lending activities.  
Drought related livestock death and livestock price variability are reported as major risks 
along with disease, predation, and banditry. Farmers noted that even when farmers did not face 
loss of herd, drought had a residual effect on livestock market prices. In drought situations, most 
pastoralists destock. A further example of the nature of the systemic and covariate risks is that 
most of the small businesses and self-help group activities were positively correlated with the 
livestock cycle. Livestock mortality due to drought or related market forces also impact these 
entrepreneurial activities. Price of a cattle in normal season was about 27,000 ksh, but villagers 
also noted that the price could be as low as 8,000 ksh. From a consensus estimate by the group, 
the livestock mortality rate would be about 80% for cattle, 20% for camel, and about 50-80% for 
goats in extreme drought condition.  
Reports of risk rationing were widespread. Pastoralists were explicit in their views that 
taking a loan would jeopardize their asset base, and they were afraid of losing collateral. In other 
words, even though there was a demand for credit, they rationed themselves out of the credit 
market. For example, Equity Bank provides loans but most do not borrow because of fear of 
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collateral loss. Borrowing and lending from friends and relatives on a reciprocal basis was a 
common means to avoid collateral loss on formal loans. When asked how much they would borrow 
without collateral requirement, they mentioned a need of 100,000 – 300,000 ksh for various 
entrepreneurial activities such as milk and meat trade, small shop, animal tracking etc.     
When playing the RCC game, six groups were formed. All 6 groups indicated that they 
would favor high potential practice with the credit option. In play 2, 5 of the 6 groups opted for 
high production using RCC rather than traditional credit. They were willing to pay a premium for 
risk protection against drought events. An interesting note is the systematic, covariate, relationship 
across enterprises. In these local communities the entirety of the economy is “co-dependent” in 
covariate shocks such as drought. This suggests that even households with no herds, but run some 
other business that is economically dependent upon herds, can also benefit from RCC. 
Maikona sub-county 
The next focus group was held in a village called Kalacha located in Maikona sub-county 
in Marsabit. Its terrain is flat and stony over large sections with intermittent areas of sandy loam.  
Livestock are predominantly camel, goats and sheep. At this focus group 17 pastoralists including 
8 women participated. This village too has self-help groups that provided soft loans to members. 
Loans were made for entrepreneurial activities such as salt sales, hand crafts such as mats, fodder 
sales, hides and skin trading, timber sale, shop keeping, and the sale of camel milk. Camel cows 
are the most valuable not only in price, but also to the community, so much so that the sale of one 
(even though privately owned) must be negotiated with village leaders. They are assumed to be 
community property even with individual ownership. The reasoning is that the pastoral community 
needs a fixed number of camel cows to be sustainable, and so the sale of one or more might affect 
the critical mass. Bull camels, however can be sold at the owner’s will. From a consensus estimate 
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by focus group members, on average each household owned about 10 camels, 30 goats and 50 
sheep. There were no cattle in this area. Camel prices depend upon body condition and ranged 
from 53,000 ksh (highest ever), but in bad times this could be as low as 20,000 ksh. The price 
ranges for goat and sheep were 3,000- 6,000 ksh and 1,500-3,000 ksh. As reported by the 
participants, drought related livestock loss is the main risk and in extreme drought conditions the 
mortality rates for camel, goat and sheep would be about 30%, 80%, and 50%, respectively. 1 
Although loans are available from Equity Bank in Marsabit, for pastoralists it is difficult 
to obtain a loan because of collateral risk. Similar to the producers in Turbi, this group was 
extremely risk rationed. However an NGO has deposited security in a local bank to offset risk so 
that herders were able to borrow up to 100,000 – 200,000 ksh, but required savings and collateral 
in any case. In most cases these requirements appeared to be prohibitive, sometimes resulting in 
deposit collateral requirements that were nearly the size of the proposed loan. 
The RCC game generated interesting discussions. Some discussants mentioned that 
reduced livestock supply in drought situations may increase prices if farmers could maintain 
livestock numbers without mass culling making loan repayment easier. It should be noted that the 
signal of risk rationing was not as strong in this group, and this may be due to SHG lending in the 
village with lower interest rates (10%) and more flexible terms. This group also seems to be 
constrained by solvency and liquidity issues. In play 2, all groups selected high potential practice 
                                                          
1 There is a very interesting communal support and informal risk sharing mechanism in the area in time of drought. 
Herders who did not lose camel cows would make a loan of (one or more) camel cows to another herder who lost 
animals. This is a usufruct type of loan. The borrower cannot sell the animal and any dealings with female offspring 
need to be approved by the owner. The borrower however, can sell bull offspring at will. The idea is of reciprocity 
since the next disaster may impact the lender and not the borrower, and in this case the original borrower will return 
the camel cow or calf to the original lender. This type of “usufruct loan” only applies to camels and not cattle, goats 
or sheep. The same was noted in Turbi and generally holds throughout the Marsabit County. 
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with RCC. They understood that a premium was involved and it would be more costly in good 
seasons. But they also recognized that this paid for the protection of loan in the bad season. 
Gadamoji sub-county  
Sagente is a rural village with agro-pastoral setup located in Gadamoji sub-county in 
Marsabit. The focus group included 21 farmers of which 6 were women. The men were herders, 
also involved in mixed farming with crops mainly maize and beans. The women were part of three 
self-help groups. Key livestock raised were goats, cattle and chicken with average herd size being 
10, 2 and 5, respectively. Average prices ranged between 3,000-6,000 ksh, 15,000 – 25,000 ksh, 
300-500 ksh, for goat, cattle and chicken, respectively. No camels and sheep were reported by the 
group. Other activities included sales of milk, eggs, and other small businesses. A typical 
configuration for crop cultivation was one acre of beans for 3 acres of maize. Maize and beans are 
mostly consumed at home, but some was sold in the Marsabit market.  
The major risk faced by the farmers is drought. Pests and disease also affect revenues.  
Prices are also variable but it seems this was not a major concern. In terms of drought, farmers 
discussed the failure of long and short rains. They indicated that if the short rains failed they could 
survive with adequate food. This is largely due to a community response of ‘neighbors helping 
neighbors’ and other reciprocal based interventions between families and friends. When long rains 
failed things became very difficult with major disruption to household and local economies. 
However when both long and short rains failed, wide spread famine resulted. Indeed, in 2013 when 
these focus groups were held, the agricultural economy still had not recovered from failure of long 
and short rains in 2010. Nonetheless when discussion was opened on whether drought risk or price 
risk would be best for farmers in this region one farmer pointedly remarked that price risk 
protection is of no use when crops have burned in the field and livestock were dead. Cattle loss 
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was about 80% with the 2010/2011 (failure of short and long rains) famine. As reported by the 
group, average farmer would lose 80% cattle and 30% goat in case of extreme drought.  
Credit is accessed through the Kenya Women Finance Trust (KWFT), Equity Bank, and 
SHG loaning and savings. KWFT has made one year agricultural loans for vegetable production, 
livestock raising and trading with fixed repayment schedule. The interest rate for the self-help 
group loan was about 20%. Equity bank would loan up to 100,000 ksh with 18% interest rate but 
only for 6 months. All borrowings required savings as collateral for borrowing. For a variety of 
reasons, risk rationing does not seem to be an issue with this group, perhaps because of community 
intervention in times of drought. Respondents indicated that if they could obtain a loan with 
minimal conditions they would happily borrow more money. But again, the fixed repayment 
scheme is a barrier. If loans can be flexible to match the timing and sequencing of cash flow from 
agricultural production they would borrow more.  
When playing the RCC game play 1, 6 groups chose high potential production with 
traditional credit while 2 groups chose production with no loan and no loss. But in play 2 when 
offered RCC all groups opted for high potential practice with RCC. They indicated that with the 
structure of RCC they could expand their herd. Also, with crop production limited by access to 
fertilizer and pesticides, crop farmers considered how they could use RCC to purchase these basic 
inputs. Participants indicated that they would use RCC for a variety of purposes including herd 
expansion, start or expand livestock trading, pay school fees, start businesses, expand crop 
cultivation, or purchase better breed of cattle for milk production.  
 
Conclusions 
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Risk-contingent credit is an insurance embedded credit product designed to manage weather and 
market risks, and to improve access to credit for smallholder farmers. From a financial 
development perspective, RCC is an important innovation that has potential to encourage 
agricultural technology adoption and build resilience which can ultimately contribute to 
agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa. Through a series of focus groups with dairy and 
pastoral farmers in Kenya, and a “game” to explain how RCC operates, there appears to be strong 
interest, support, and need for RCC type structures. This appears to be universal in the areas we 
visited. Farmers certainly understood the concept and mechanism for RCC and could imagine how 
it would benefit them. Following our focus groups and games, we received numerous messages 
from the participating farmers asking when RCC would be available in the respective areas.   
The methodology described in this paper can be used in extension programs for promoting 
innovative rural microcredit in developing countries, but should be modified according to the local 
production and associated risks farmers face. It is important to point out that RCC can take many 
forms, and its implementation ought to consider the specific needs of farmers. With Kenyan dairy 
farmers the risk is actually in operating margins across rainfall-contingent price dynamics.  RCC 
could be linked directly to prices, price-feed margins, or directly to dry and wet seasonal activities. 
Which is most correlated with farm risks is an empirical question. For northern Kenyan 
pastoralists, RCC using drought related livestock mortality index can be developed, but alternative 
mechanisms should also be considered including duration or failure of long and/or short rains with 
scaled tranches based on the intensity or duration of the drought. Given the importance of good 
product structure on uptake, future research is needed on developing suitable RCC designs for both 
dairy and pastoral livestock farmers to promote RCC pilots in the area.  
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Appendix 
Play 1 information sheet 
 
(1) Make your decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) Good season and bad season determined through random draw 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) End of season earning = Amount earn – Loan repayment 
 
 
  
High Potential Practice (H) 
Normal season: earn = 30,000 
Bad season: earn = 0 
 
Traditional Credit (TC) 
Pay: 4000 at the end of season 
 
OR 
Traditional Practice (T) 
Normal season: earn = 10,000 
Bad season: earn = 0 
 
No Credit Needed (N) 
Pay: 0 
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Play 2 information sheet 
 
(1) Make your decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) Good season and bad season determined through random draw 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) End of season earning = Amount earn – Loan repayment - Premium 
 
 
 
  
High Potential Practice (H) 
Normal season: earn = 30,000 
Bad season: earn = 0 
 
Traditional Credit (TC) 
Pay: 4,000 at season end 
 
OR 
Traditional Practice (T) 
Normal season: earn = 10,000 
Bad season: earn = 0 
 
No Credit Needed (N) 
Pay: 0 
 
Risk Contingent Credit (RCC) 
Normal season: Pay = 4,000, 
Premium= 200 
Bad season: Pay: 0 
 
OR 
30 
 
Play 3 information sheet 
 
(1) Make your decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) Good season and bad season determined through random draw 
 
 
(3) Basis risk determined through random draw 
 
 
 
(4) End of season earning = Amount earn – Loan repayment - Premium 
 
 
High Potential Practice (H) 
Normal season: earn = 30,000 
Bad season: earn = 0 
 
Traditional Credit (TC) 
Pay: 4,000 at season end 
 
OR 
Traditional Practice (T) 
Normal season: earn = 10,000 
Bad season: earn = 0 
 
No Credit Needed (N) 
Pay: 0 
 
Risk Contingent Credit (RCC) 
Normal season: Pay =4,000 and 
Premium= 200 
Bad season: Pay: 0 or Pay = 4,000 and 
Premium= 200 
 
OR 
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                               Table A1. Sample game responses and results 
RISK CONTINGENT CREDIT GAME/ ROLE PLAY 
           
Group 
Play 1 Play 2 Play 3 
Decision Normal Season Bad season Decision Normal Season 
Bad 
Season Decision Normal Season 
Bad Season 
No  
repayment 
Unfortunate  
repayment 
1 T 10,000 0 
T  
10,000 0 
T  
10,000 0 0 
N N N 
2 H 26,000 -4,000 
H 
25,600 0 
H 
25,800 0 -4,400 
TC RCC RCC 
3 H 26,000 -4,000 
H 
26,000 -4,000 
H 
26,000 -4,000 -4,000 
TC TC TC 
4 H 26,000 -4,000 
H 
25,600 0 
H 
25,800 0 -4,400 
TC RCC RCC 
5 T 10,000 0 
T 
10,000 0 
T 
10,000 0 0 
N N N 
6 H 26,000 -4,000 
H 
26,000 -4,000 
H 
26,000 -4,000 -4,000 
TC TC TC 
7 H 26,000 -4,000 
H 
26,000 -4,000 
H 
26,000 -4,000 -4,000 
TC TC TC 
 
Note:     [T = Traditional Practice and N = No Credit] 
 [H = High Potential Practice and TC = Traditional Credit] 
 [H = High Potential Practice and RCC = Risk Contingent Credit]  
